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The Exhaustion Doctrine: State
Prisoners Caught Between Civil Rights
Actions and Writs of Habeas Corpus
On one hand, the exhaustion doctrine requires state prisoners to
exhaust their state remedies before filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court when they contest their confine-
ment. On the other hand, prisoners challenging their civil rights
may file in federal court without exhausting all state remedies.
This Comment addresses how federal courts should determine
which rule to apply when a prisoner brings an action contesting
confinement, but seeks only declaratory relief or damages.
I. INTRODUCTION
State prisoners have two avenues of redress to challenge a viola-
tion of their rights. First, they may petition for a writ of habeas
corpus when challenging their confinement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1
Second, they may bring a civil rights action when challenging the
conditions of their imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 A habeas
1. The first section of the code provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
judge shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
2. The Civil Rights Act states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
corpus action requires exhaustion of all state remedies prior to bring-
ing a suit in the federal courts,3 while a civil action does not.4 A
conflict may arise when a prisoner brings a civil rights action that
challenges confinement. Normally when prisoners challenging their
confinement seek actual reduction or rescission of their sentences
their actions fall within section 2254. 5 By contrast, when prisoners
challenge their confinement seeking only damages or declaratory re-
lief the federal courts apply widely varying standards.
6
This Comment addresses the conflict that occurs as the result of
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action of law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
3. Statutory exhaustion requires that "[a]n applicant shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this
section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available proce-
dure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1988).
4. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). In the Monroe case, the Monroes
sued Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago for violation of their civil rights
because Chicago police officers entered and searched the Monroes' home and arrested
Mr. Monroe, all without search or arrest warrants. The Supreme Court upheld the action
against the police officers, regardless of the exhaustion of state remedies, stating, "It is
no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before a federal one is invoked." Id. An additional important difference between
the two actions is that damages are not an available remedy under a writ of habeas
corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 493 (1973).
5. "Release from penal custody is not an available remedy under the Civil Rights
Act." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 479 (quoting Peinado v. Adult Authority of Dept. of Correc-
tions, 405 F.2d 1185, 1186 (9th Cir. 1969)).
6. See Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974) (civil rights action by a
prisoner claiming that his phone had been illegally wiretapped was dismissed for failure
to exhaust state remedies); Mack v. Varelas, 835 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1987) (state prisoner
bringing civil rights action against sheriff for failure to produce witness at criminal trial
fell within § 1983 and did not require exhaustion of remedies); Brown v. Fauver, 819
F.2d 395 (3rd Cir. 1987) (inmate's civil rights claim challenging prison disciplinary pro-
cedures, including removal of good time credits, was dismissed for lack of exhaustion of
state remedies); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983) (prisoner's civil rights
action for monetary damages from improper crediting of good time credits was dis-
missed); Spina v. Aaron, 821 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1987) (prisoner claiming violation of
due process when implicated in prison escape required to exhaust all state remedies be-
cause, although the complaint did not request reinstatement of good time credits, a deter-
mination could affect the fact or duration of his confinement); Hadley v. Werner, 753
F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985) (prisoner brought civil rights action claiming ineffective assis-
tance of counsel; court of appeals dismissed the case for failure to exhaust state reme-
dies); Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1989) (prisoners implicated in attempted
escape filed action claiming denial of due process and were not required to exhaust state
remedies as action fell under § 1983); Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1987)
(inmate brought an action for deprivation of good time credits and the court stayed the
claim pending exhaustion of all state remedies); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.
1990) (prisoner sued for deprivation of good time credits and court stayed claim until the
exhaustion of all state remedies); Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616 (11th Cir. 1989) (pris-
oner's claim of racial prejudice in denial of parole and compassionate leave fell within §
1983 and did not require exhaustion of state remedies).
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the overlap between section 22547 and section 19838 when prisoners
challenging their confinement seek damages or declaratory relief.
Part Two provides a historical overview of the writ of habeas corpus,
the exhaustion doctrine, and civil rights actions under section 1983.
Part Three discusses the Supreme Court's answer to the conflict as
set forth in the cases of Preiser v. Rodriguez9 and Wolff v. McDon-
nell.'0 Part Four analyzes the circuit courts' implementations of the
Supreme Court guidelines, as well as the division among the circuit
courts. Finally, Part Five proposes a resolution of the division by the
use of a two-pronged test that first focuses on what the prisoner is
challenging, then, in some cases, upon the remedy the prisoner is
seeking. As a result, prisoners' civil rights actions not challenging
their underlying conviction would be analyzed according to the Su-
preme Court guidelines, that is, according to the remedy sought. Al-
ternatively, prisoners' civil rights actions challenging their
underlying convictions would be subject to the habeas corpus re-
quirements and the prisoners would be required to exhaust their
state remedies.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Habeas Corpus and the Exhaustion Doctrine
The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum originated in 16th
century England."1 By the late 1600s the writ was the usual manner
that a person would use to regain their liberty when wrongfully im-
prisoned.' 2 The Colonists used habeas corpus when faced with any
situation of illegal physical confinement.13 Subsequently, the United
States Constitution recognized the writ. 4 Originally, the question of
the court's jurisdiction to hear the case was the limit of habeas
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). See supra notes 1, 3 and accompanying text; infra
note 20.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
10. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
11. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484.
12. Id. A Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas stated, "The writ of habeas
corpus is now the most usual remedy by which a man is restored again to his liberty, if
he have been against law deprived of it." Bushnell's Case, Vaughan 135, 136, 124 Eng.
Rep. 1006, 1007 (1670).
13. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 485.
14. The Suspension Clause states: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
corpus.'5 Over time, the writ expanded to cover any confinement vio-
lating the Constitution or fundamental law, regardless of whether
the court had jurisdiction.' 6
The Supreme Court first recognized the exhaustion doctrine in the
case of Ex parte Royall.17 The exhaustion doctrine requires that
prisoners seeking relief through a writ of habeas corpus exhaust all
state remedies before seeking relief in the federal courts. 8 The basis
15. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 485 (citing Ex parte Watkins, 29 U.S. 193 (1830)).
16. Id. (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938)). The Preiser Court cited the following cases as representative of the variety
of claims that may be brought by writ of habeas corpus: Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371
(1880) (challenges to custody claiming the statute under which the person was convicted
is unconstitutional); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (challenges to custody prior
to trial when indictment is defective); In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894) (challenges to
confinement in the wrong institution); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (chal-
lenges to denial of constitutional rights at trial); Von Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 708
(1948) (challenges to invalid guilty pleas); Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972) (chal-
lenges to unlawful detention by the Executive or military); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972) (challenges to unlawful revocation of parole). Habeas relief also applies to
prisoners on parole and a person who has been released on bail or on their own recogni-
zance. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 486 n.7.
The most frequently raised grounds for relief in habeas corpus proceedings include:
(a) Conviction obtained by a plea of guilty which was unlawfully induced or
not made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and
consequences of the plea.
(b) Conviction obtained by use of coerced confession.
(c) Conviction obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure, [where the state has not provided a full and fair
hearing on the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim].
(d) Conviction obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unlawful
arrest [where the state has not provided a full and fair hearing on the
merits of the Fourth Amendment claim].
(e) Conviction obtained by a violation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
(f) Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to
disclose defendant evidence favorable to the defendant.
(g) Conviction obtained by a violation of the protection against double jeop-
ardy.
(h) Conviction obtained by action of a grand or petit jury which was unconsti-
tutionally selected and impaneled.
(i) Denial of effective assistance of counsel.
(j) Denial of right to appeal.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254
CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 5 (Comm. Print 1976).
17. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
18. This is considered one of the great disadvantages of habeas corpus relief. Sec-
tion 1983 claims are thought to be favorable because no exhaustion is requiied. Other
ways in which civil rights claims appear preferable to habeas corpus claims include:
(1) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedures apply fully to an action under § 1983, but
only partially to habeas corpus cases, making areas such as discovery of prison records
more difficult.
(2) A § 1983 claim may be brought as a class action lawsuit. A habeas corpus class
action suit might not be allowed because habeas corpus is intended to be an individual
remedy.
(3) Monetary damages may be recovered only in a § 1983 claim.
Mark M. Sanders & Peter H. Moulton, Federal Post Conviction Relief ("Habeas
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of the exhaustion doctrine lies in federal and state comity, with the
underlying concept that the state should have an opportunity to cor-
rect errors within its system before being scrutinized by the federal
courts.19
The exhaustion doctrine was codified by Congress in 28 U.S.C. §
225420 in 1948. Since codification, the Supreme Court has further
defined the exhaustion doctrine, requiring total exhaustion of claims
in habeas petitions containing exhausted and unexhausted, or
"mixed," claims." Additionally, if the state fails to raise the issue of
nonexhaustion, the court may consider the issue waived, unless com-
ity and judicial efficiency dictate otherwise. 2
Exhaustion is not required for civil rights claims brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.23 Yet, a dilemma arises when a prisoner brings
a suit claiming a civil rights violation if the remedy affects the length
of confinement, even in those cases in which the prisoner is seeking
only damages or declaratory relief.
Corpus"), 16 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 117, 118-19 (1984).
The advantages to bringing a suit in federal court include the fact that federal judges
may be more isolated from political pressure and public opinion than state court judges.
See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1125-28 (1977).
"Most states do not have adequate judicial remedies and workable procedures for han-
dling prisoners' claims relating to prison conditions .... [E]ven in states which do have
adequate remedies, prisoners, ... historically, found a much friendlier reception in fed-
eral courts." SHELDON KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS IN
A NUTSHELL 254-55 (3d ed. 1988).
19. The reasoning behind the policy is the far-reaching grasp of habeas corpus.
"[H]abeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure. It
comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings." Frank v. Morgan,
237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20. The second section of the statute reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or
the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1991).
21. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
22. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
23. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988);
supra note 2.
B. Section 1983 and Prisoners' Civil Rights
The Civil Rights Act, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983,24 originated as
Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871.28 The inten-
tion of the Act was to bolster the Fourteenth Amendment, as evi-
denced by its title, "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
and for Other Purposes. '26 The primary aims of the Act were to
override offending state laws,21 to provide a federal remedy when
state laws were inadequate,2 8 and to provide a federal remedy when
a state remedy theoretically existed, but in reality was not
available.29
Nonetheless, for years the federal courts adopted a "hands-off"
approach toward the corrections system. That is, the federal courts
declined to make decisions about the methods used in the corrections
system.30 Following the hands-off approach, the courts later reached
the opposite extreme with an "open door" approach. In other words,
the federal courts addressed issues that ranged from the complex to
the mundane without requiring exhaustion of either administrative
24. See supra note 2. According to the Supreme Court in Wolff, the Constitutional
rights of prisoners include: religious freedom, access to the courts, freedom from racial
discrimination, and due process of law before being deprived of life, liberty, and property.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
25. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171.
26. Id. At the Congressional debates, Senator Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary stated:
The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as defining the rights
secured by the Constitution of the United States when they are assailed by any
state law or under color of any State law, and it is merely carrying out the
principles of the civil rights bill, which has since become a part of the
Constitution.
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., Ist Sess., App. 68, 80, 83-85).
27. Id. at 173. The Court explained that "[t]here are threads of many thoughts
running through the debates .... First, it might, of course, override certain kinds of state
laws." Id.
28. Id. at 173-74. Senator Sherman of Ohio explained this "thread" with an
example:
[I]t is said that the reason is that any offense may be committed upon a negro
by a white man, and a negro cannot testify in any case against a white man, so
that the only way by which any conviction can be had in Kentucky in those
cases is in the United States courts, because the United States courts enforce
the United States laws by which negroes may testify.
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 345.)
29. Id. at 174. Some examples of § 1983 actions by prisoners that were upheld by
the Supreme Court include: Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (prisoner claimed he
was denied privileges solely because of his religious beliefs); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249 (1971) (prisoners claimed poor living conditions and unreasonable disciplinary
measures); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (prisoner claimed physical injuries
occurred while he was unlawfully placed in solitary confinement).
30. THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING
PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN FEDERAL COURT 29-30 (1980).
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or judicial state remedies. 1 During this period, the Supreme Court
first applied section 1983 to state officials in Monroe v. Pape.32 Addi-
tionally, the Court in Monroe held that section 1983 did not require
exhaustion of state remedies. 3 Shortly after the Monroe decision,
the Court held specifically that a state prisoner could bring suit
against prison officials under section 1983. 31 These decisions created
an overlap between section 1983 and habeas corpus that led to the
Supreme Court's decisions discussed in the following section.
The courts today are in what the Federal Judicial Center calls "a
period of re-evaluation," in which the courts are trying to achieve a
balance between the "hands-off' and the "open-door" approaches to
prisoners' civil rights litigation. 35 The issue of exhaustion of state
remedies is a large part of that balancing act.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION
The seminal Supreme Court cases concerning the line between
habeas corpus and civil rights actions are Preiser v. Rodriguez6 and
Wolff v. McDonnell.37 In Preiser, the Supreme Court set forth a rule
that a prisoner need not exhaust his state remedies when seeking
relief other than the fact or duration of confinement .3  Wolff con-
firms the Preiser rule. 9
A. Preiser v. Rodriguez: Fact or Duration of Confinement
In Preiser, three New York prisoners lost good conduct time cred-
its through disciplinary actions. The prisoners claimed they had been
unconstitutionally deprived of their good time credits.40 They each
31. Id. at 30-31.
32. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
33. Id. at 167.
34. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
35. THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 30, at 31-32.
36. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
37. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
38. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 494.
39. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554-55.
40. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 478, 480-81. Rodriguez lost 120 days of accumulated good
time credits after contraband was discovered in his cell. He asserted that he was actually
being punished because he refused to disclose where the materials originated from. Be-
cause he had no hearing on that issue, he claimed that his due process rights had been
violated. Id. at 478. The second prisoner, Katzoff, lost 50 days of good time credits for
writing derogatory comments about prison officials in his personal diary. He claimed that
the prison officials had violated his constitutional rights by punishing him for statements
in a personal diary. Id. at 480. The third prisoner, Kritsky, lost 600 days of good time for
leading a prison-wide demonstration. Kritsky claimed that his due process rights were
sought injunctive relief to reinstate the credits, which in each case
would have resulted in immediate release from prison. 41 The court of
appeals consolidated the actions and upheld the district courts' resto-
ration of good time credits in each of the cases.42
The Supreme Court overturned the court of appeals decision and
refused the request to restore lost good time credits. 43 The Court
interpreted these actions to fall "within the core of habeas corpus in
attacking the very duration of their physical confinement itself."44 In
addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congressional intent,"4
state and federal comity,4" and efficiency 47 called for the use of
habeas corpus in this type of action. The Court held that habeas
violated when he was summarily sentenced after pleading not guilty. Id. at 481.
41. Id. at 479-81. The district court restored Rodriguez' good time credits under
the Civil Rights Act. The court reasoned that the habeas corpus claim was "merely a
proper adjunct to insure full relief ... in the dominant civil rights claim." Rodriguez v.
McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627, 628-29 (N.D.N.Y. 1969). A divided court of appeals (prior
to the joinder of the three cases) reversed the decision, stating, "Use of the Civil Rights
Statutes to secure the release of persons imprisoned by State Courts would thus have the
effect of repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2254; of course, such was not the intent of Congress."
Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730, 731 (2d Cir. 1971) (quoting Johnson v. Walker,
317 F.2d 418, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1963)). Katzoff was also granted his good time credits by
the district court, only to be reversed by a divided court of appeals. Preiser, 411 U.S. at
480 (citing United States ex rel. Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1971)).
Katzoff was granted his good time by the district court and before the court of appeals
decided the case on appeal, the three cases were consolidated and brought before the
court of appeals en banc. Id. at 482.
42. Id. The Court held that "complaints of state prisoners relating to the condi-
tions of their confinement were cognizable either in federal habeas corpus or under the
Civil Rights Act, and that as civil rights actions they were not subject to any require-
ment of exhaustion of state remedies." Id.
43. Id. at 500.
44. Id. at 487-88. "In any event, the nature of the respondents' suits was an attack
on the legality of their physical confinement itself; and to deal with such attacks on
physical custody, however imposed and whether not related to conviction by a court, is
the long-established function of habeas corpus." Id. at 488 n.8.
45. Id. at 489-90. "In amending the habeas corpus laws in 1948, Congress clearly
required exhaustion of adequate state remedies as a condition precedent to the invocation
of federal judicial relief ... and that specific determination must override the general
terms of § 1983." Id. See also supra note 20.
46. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490. The Court explained the reasoning behind the habeas
corpus statute:
[T]he reason why only habeas corpus can be used to challenge a state pris-
oner's underlying conviction is the strong policy requiring exhaustion of state
remedies in that situation-to avoid the unnecessary friction between the fed-
eral and state court systems that would result if a lower federal court upset a
state court conviction without first giving the state court system an opportunity
to correct its own constitutional errors.
Id.
47. Id. at 492. The Court explains that
because most potential litigation involving state prisoners arises on a day-to-
day basis, it is most efficient and properly handled by the state administrative
bodies and state courts, which are . . . familiar with the grievances of state
prisoners and in a better physical and practical position to deal with these
grievances.
Id.
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corpus should extend to civil rights actions when prisoners seek judg-
ments that go directly to the fact or duration of their confinement.48
The Supreme Court distinguished a habeas petition from a section
1983 claim on the basis of the relief requested, not upon the alleged
facts.4 9 The Court reasoned that an action for damages did not fulfill
the traditional purpose underlying habeas corpus.50 Thus, an action
for damages would fall under section 1983.1 The Court explicitly
stated that in such a case it would be unnecessary for the prisoner to
exhaust all of his state remedies.52
B. Wolff v. McDonnell: Remedy Short of Restoration
of Good Time Credits
In the Wolff case, 53 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in
Preiser.5 4 In Wolff, a Nebraska prisoner brought a class action suit
complaining, among other things, that the prison's procedures for de-
priving prisoners of good time credits violated their due process
rights. 55 The prisoners requested that the good time credits be re-
stored, that prison officials submit a plan for a hearing procedure
that complied with due process, and that the prisoners be awarded
damages for the deprivation of their civil rights.56
The Supreme Court determined that the claim for damages could
48. Id. at 500. The Court specifically held that "when a state prisoner is challeng-
ing the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that
imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Id.
49. Id. at'494.
50. Id. at 493. "In the case of damages, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or
available federal remedy." Id. at 494 (emphasis in original). Recall that money damages
are not available under habeas corpus. See supra note 4.
51. Presier, 411 U.S. at 494. "[A] damages action by a state prisoner could be
brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court without any requirement of prior
.exhaustion of state remedies." Id.
52. Id. The Court explained: "If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attack-
ing something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking some-
thing other than immediate or more speedy release-the traditional purpose of habeas
corpus." Id.
53. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
54. Id. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
55. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 543. In addition, the prisoners alleged that the inspection of
mail between inmate and attorney was unconstitutional and that the inmate assistance
program was constitutionally inadequate. The district court granted partial relief. The
court restored the good time credits, but rejected the due process claim. The court of
appeals reversed and denied the requested restoration of the good time credits, but or-
dered that the prison officials expunge any records made in violation of a prisoner's due
process rights. Id. at 543-44.
56. Id. at 553.
go forward. 57 The Court interpreted Preiser to preclude only the in-
junctive relief of restoring the good time credits. 8 The Court then
held that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal court may "determine
the validity of the procedures for revoking good time credits and to
fashion appropriate remedies for any constitutional violations ascer-
tained, short of ordering the actual restoration of good time already
canceled."5 9 Thus, the Supreme Court granted the federal courts
broad discretion to review section 1983 claims.
IV. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' DIVISION
In the aftermath of Preiser and Wolff, the circuit courts have in-
terpreted the rule for exhaustion of remedies differently. Most cir-
cuits have held, contrary to the apparent rule of the Supreme Court,
that state remedies must be exhausted in a section 1983 action re-
quiring a determination of the validity of the sentence, regardless of
the requested relief.10 These courts have proceeded using either a
test examining the validity of the sentence"1 or a collateral estoppel
test.62 In contrast, a few circuits in recent decisions have used a test
looking at the relief requested, in recognition of the apparent Su-
preme Court test set forth in Preiser and Wolff. 3 This section exam-
ines representative circuit cases for each treatment of the issue.
A. Validity of the Sentence
A majority of the circuits apply a test focusing on whether the
prisoners are challenging the validity of their underlying sentences.6
57. Id. at 554. "Preiser expressly contemplated that claims properly brought under
§ 1983 could go forward while actual restoration of good-time credits is sought in state
proceedings." Id.
58. Id. at 555. The court stated:
Such a declaratory judgment as a predicate to a damages award would not be
barred by Preiser, and because under that case only an injunction restoring
good time improperly taken is foreclosed, neither would it preclude a litigant
with standing from obtaining by way of ancillary relief an otherwise proper
injunction enjoining the prospective enforcement of invalid prison regulations.
Id.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 6.
61. See infra notes 64-96 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 106-29 and accompanying text.
64. Even among the circuits applying a "validity of the sentence" test, the results
differ. Some circuit courts dismiss without prejudice any § 1983 civil rights action requir-
ing a federal court to declare the validity of a state court's criminal conviction before
exhaustion of all state remedies. The First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits appear to
follow this method. See Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (Ist Cir. 1974) (civil rights
action by a prisoner claiming that his phone had been illegally wiretapped was dismissed
for failure to exhaust state remedies); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395 (3rd Cir. 1987)
(inmate's civil rights claim challenging prison disciplinary procedures, including removal
of good time credits, was dismissed for lack of exhaustion of state remedies); Todd v.
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The First, Second, and Sixth Circuits provide examples of the test
used to require exhaustion when a prisoner challenges an underlying
conviction. 5 The Ninth Circuit provides an example of the test ex-
tended to require exhaustion when prisoners challenge prison proce-
dures affecting the length of their sentences.6 "
1. The First Circuit: Guerro v. Mulhearn
Shortly after the decision in Preiser, the First Circuit decided
Guerro v. Mulhearn.67 In Guerro, a prisoner claimed that perjury
was committed in order to obtain a search warrant to search his
apartment. Additionally, he asserted that his telephone was illegally
wiretapped and the prosecution concealed the existence of the wire-
tap during trial.6 ' The prisoner sued for declaratory judgment and
compensatory and punitive damages. 69 The court of appeals found
that Guerro did not fall within the "core of habeas corpus" test of
Preiser.7 0 Additionally, the court recognized that the Supreme Court
had "expressly distinguished the situation where the relief sought is
damages, rather than release from incarceration.1
7 1
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, determined
that Preiser was not controlling because in Preiser the Supreme
Court had not been faced with a case that required a ruling on the
validity of a state criminal conviction.72 In support of its decision,
Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983) (prisoner's civil rights action for monetary dam-
ages from improper crediting of good time credits was dismissed); Hadley v. Werner, 753
F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985) (A prisoner brought civil rights action claiming ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. The court of appeals dismissed the case for failure to exhaust state
remedies.). Other circuits stay § 1983 actions until the prisoner has exhausted all state
remedies. See Mack v. Varelas, 835 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1987) (state prisoner bringing
civil rights action against sheriff for failure to produce witness at criminal trial fell
within § 1983 and did not require exhaustion of remedies); Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d
1256 (8th Cir. 1987) (inmate brought an action for deprivation of good time credits and
the court stayed the claim pending exhaustion of all state remedies); Young v. Kenny,
907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (prisoner sued for deprivation of good time credits and
court stayed claim until the exhaustion of all state remedies).
65. See infra notes 67-86 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
67. 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974).
68. Id. at 1251.
69. Id.
70. Id. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
71. Guerro, 498 F.2d at 1251.
72. Id. at 1252. The court of appeals distinguished the Presier decision:
Although the Court expressly distinguished the situation where the relief
sought is money damages, rather than release from incarceration, it did so in
the context of a case in which determination of a damage claim would not
the First Circuit used a policy argument outlined in Preiser that sec-
tion 1983 actions should not be a vehicle for circumvention of habeas
corpus."3 In the same vein, the court cited Supreme Court decisions
holding that federal suits for equitable relief must be dismissed if
they concern the same matter as, and would interfere with, an ongo-
ing state prosecution. 4 Thus, the First Circuit resolved the conflict
by dismissing the civil rights action pending exhaustion of state rem-
edies when the court would have to make a judgment on the original
conviction.
2. The Second Circuit: Mack v. Varelas
In Mack v. Varelas,7 5 a prisoner sought damages from the sher-
iff's department and the deputy sheriff for failing to comply with a
court order to produce a witness, thus depriving Mack of his Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense.76 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found that Mack's claim for damages should not
have been treated as a petition for habeas corpus. 77 Because the pris-
oner was seeking something other than immediate or speedy release
and he was not attacking the length of his confinement, a judgment
did not depend on the validity of his confinement.78 The circuit court
require ruling upon the validity of a state criminal conviction during the pen-
dency of the criminal process. Since the instant case does not come within the
"core of habeas corpus" as defined in Preiser, but also is unlike the kind of
damage action which the Court there held, would not be subject to an exhaus-
tion requirement, we think that Preiser is not here controlling.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 1253. The court stated:
Preiser, nevertheless, is highly relevant to the issue under discussion. The
Court's holding demonstrates the importance of preserving the integrity of the
writ of habeas corpus, in its traditional context, from circumvention of the limi-
tations placed upon the writ. The writ of habeas corpus is, after all, the more
narrow and specific remedy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
74. Id. (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971)).
The Guerro court explained the Supreme Court's holdings in Samuels and Younger:
"[T]o preserve proper respect for our federal system, and additionally, to prevent undue
interference with the orderly administration of criminal justice, federal suits for equitable
relief must be dismissed if they concern the same matter as is the subject of an ongoing
state prosecution, and would interfere with that prosecution." Id.
75. 835 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 997. Mack and his accomplice Jefferson were charged with robbery. Jef-
ferson pled guilty. Mack requested that the incarcerated Jefferson be produced as a wit-
ness at Mack's trial before February 7th. The sheriff's department failed to produce
Jefferson by February l1th and Mack's motion for continuance was denied by the trial
court. Jefferson did not testify and the jury found Mack guilty. Id.
77. Id. The district court reasoned that the claim properly fell within the realm of
habeas corpus because "any damage he suffered by the alleged inaction of defendant is
dependent on a determination of the invalidity of the conviction." The claim was dis-
missed for failure to exhaust state remedies. Id.
78. Id. at 998. "[A] civil rights action for damages, insofar as it does not also seek
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overturned the lower court's dismissal for failure to exhaust all state
remedies.79 The circuit court then stayed the prisoner's claim on the
"prudential consideration that those [state criminal] proceedings
may suffice to establish that Mack's incarceration does not constitute
injury."' 0 Hence, the Second Circuit appears to follow a rule requir-
ing a stay of section 1983 action pending exhaustion of remedies
based on whether the prisoner is challenging the validity of the un-
derlying sentence.
3. The Sixth Circuit: Hadley v. Werner
In Hadley v. Werner," a prisoner sought damages on the theory
that an inadequate fee schedule for appointed counsel denied him
effective assistance of counsel."2 Hadley maintained that as a result
of ineffective assistance of counsel he had involuntarily pled guilty.
83
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the
action seeking damages and maintained that the proper recourse for
Hadley was a petition for habeas corpus.84 Relying on the First Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Guerro v. Mulhearn,5 the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the decision in Preiser did not con-
trol section 1983 actions for money damages."6 Therefore, the Sixth
to void or shorten the term of imprisonment, is not a challenge that should be made by
means of a habeas petition . . . ." Id.
79. Id. at 998-99. The court explained: "Mack's complaint is a civil rights com-
plaint and is not properly characterized as a habeas petition.... [T]he complaint as-
sumes that Mack will remain confined for the entire length of the sentence, and it
demands damages for each day of his ordered confinement." Id. at 998.
80. Id. at 999.
81. 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985).
82. Id. at 515. Hadley claimed that the fee schedule was so low that only inexperi-
enced and incompetent attorneys were attracted. Even then he maintained that those
attorneys did not devote their full efforts to the cases because of the minimal amount of
compensation. Hadley pursued $85 million in damages and an injunction to prevent the
defendants from violating his constitutional rights in the future. Id.
83. Id. at 516.
84. Id. The court did, however, vacate the district court's judgment that the pris-
oner had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id.
85. Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (Ist Cir. 1974).
86. Hadley, 753 F.2d at 516. The court explained that Preiser did not control
Hadley's appeal, quoting language from Preiser that "a damages action by a state pris-
oner could be brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court without any require-
ment of prior exhaustion of state remedies." Id. (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 494). The
court also cited Supreme Court dicta: "More recently the Court acknowledged that it has
not determined 'if a Federal District Court should abstain from deciding a section 1983
suit for damages stemming from an unlawful conviction pending collateral exhaustion of
state court attacks on the conviction itself.'" Id. (quoting Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914
(1984)).
Circuit also dismissed a civil rights action for failure to exhaust state
remedies in a case involving the underlying conviction.
4. The Ninth Circuit: Young v. Kenny
In Young v. Kenny, 7 a prisoner sued for damages for the state
officials' failure to apply jail-time credits to his prison sentence. 8
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit modified the district
court's dismissal to stay the claim pending the exhaustion of state
remedies."9 The court held that "habeas must be the exclusive fed-
eral remedy not just when a state prisoner requests the invalidation
or reduction of his sentence, but whenever the requested relief re-
quires as its predicate a determination that a sentence currently be-
ing served is invalid or unconstitutionally long."90
The Ninth Circuit court recognized a potential conflict with the
Preiser and Wolff decisions.9 ' Nonetheless, the court asserted that
habeas corpus must be the exclusive federal remedy whenever the
requested relief requires a determination on the sentence being
served. The court claimed that this position agreed with all other
circuits who had decided the issue.92 Additionally, the circuit court
cited the Eighth Circuit decision in Offet, which proposed that inter-
preting Wolff to allow a state prisoner to circumvent the exhaustion
requirement through artful pleading would put Wolff in direct con-
flict with the rationale of Preiser.93 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit
87. 907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
88. Id. at 875.
89. Id. at 878. The court reasoned that "[b]ecause Young is still in prison and has
failed to exhaust his state remedies, a federal court judgment that his jail-time credits
have been improperly withheld would undermine the exhaustion requirement in federal
habeas corpus actions and frustrate important values of federal state comity." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
90. Id. at 876 (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 877. The court, after quoting language from Wolff, stated: "We are
acutely aware that this language appears to conflict with the rule we have just adopted;
this passage from Wolff may suggest that the exclusivity of habeas turns on the type of
relief requested by the plaintiff." Id.
92. Id. at 876-77. In support of their statement the court cited Guerro v.
Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1251-55 (1st Cir. 1974); Mack v. Varelas, 835 F.2d 995, 998
(2d Cir. 1987); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 397-99 (3rd Cir. 1987); Todd v. Basker-
ville, 712 F.2d 70, 72-73 (4th Cir. 1983); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 373 (5th
Cir. 1981); Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1985); Hanson v. Heckle, 791
F.2d 93, 94-97 (7th Cir. 1986); Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1258-61 (8th Cir. 1987);
Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616, 626-27 (1lth Cir. 1989). The court later discussed the
disparity between the circuit court position and the apparent meaning of the Supreme
Court in Wolff: "Although we join our sister circuits, we share a concern expressed by
many of them.... Many of the decisions cited above discuss Wolff at length and attempt
to distinguish it, none very persuasively." Young, 907 F.2d at 877.
93. Id. The court explained:
While we, too, are unable to come up with a principled way of distinguishing
Wolff, we agree with Judge Bowman writing for the Eighth Circuit, that 'to
read Wolff as allowing a state prisoner to avoid exhaustion requirement by
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court supported its decision through dicta in the Supreme Court case
of Tower v. Glover,94 although Tower did not involve the issue being
decided in Young. 5 The Supreme Court, however, stated in Tower,
"We . ..have no occasion to decide if a Federal District Court
should abstain from deciding a § 1983 suit for damages stemming
from an unlawful conviction pending the collateral exhaustion of
state-court attacks on the conviction itself."96 Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit requires the staying of a civil rights claim pending exhaustion of
state remedies when a determination on the underlying sentence is
required.
B. Collateral Estoppel Test
Another method the courts have used to determine whether the
exhaustion doctrine applies is the collateral estoppel test.9 7 This test
was articulated in Spina v. Aaron.9" In Spina, a prisoner brought an
action after being found guilty of attempted escape, alleging insuffi-
cient evidence.9 9 Spina asked for a more favorable security status,
for expunging all records of an attempted escape, and for damages
artful pleading is to set Wolff at odds with the rationale of Preiser, and we do
not believe that the court intended such a result.
Id. (quoting Offet, 823 F.2d at 1260).
94. 467 U.S. 914 (1984).
95. Young, 907 F.2d at 877-78. The court stated, "Even though the issue we con-
sider today was not presented in Tower... we presume that the Tower majority deliber-
ately included it in its opinion to signal that the Court deems itself not to have ruled on
our issue." Id. at 878.
96. Tower, 467 U.S. at 923. See also Young, 907 F.2d at 878; see supra note 86.
97. These courts have generally allowed the trial court the option to stay or dismiss
a § 1983 claim requiring determination of the validity of a state court criminal prosecu-
tion. See Spina v. Aaron, 821 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1987) (prisoner claiming violation of
due process when implicated in prison escape required to exhaust all state remedies be-
cause although the complaint did not request reinstatement of good-time credits a deter-
mination could affect the fact or duration of his confinement); Hernandez v. Spencer,
780 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1986); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1981);
Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616 (11th Cir. 1989) (prisoner's claim of racial prejudice in
denial of parole and compassionate leave fell within § 1983 and did not require exhaus-
tion of state remedies).
98. 821 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1987).
99. Id. at 1128. Spina involved a federal prisoner, however, the court used a paral-
lel analysis as if he had been a state prisoner, stating,
Although the policies underlying the system of federal habeas corpus relief
granted state prisoners are not identical to those underlying the framework of
relief granted federal prisoners, the fact remains that, for both state and fed-
eral prisoners, Congress has chosen habeas corpus as the appropriate avenue to
challenge fact or duration of a prisoner's confinement.
Id.
for violation of his constitutional rights.100 The Court of Appeal for
the Fifth Circuit found that Spina's actions should have been pur-
sued under habeas corpus because he challenged a hearing that had
affected the date of his release. 101
The court reasoned that Congress had determined that habeas
corpus was the appropriate remedy for a prisoner to challenge the
fact or duration of their confinement. Thus, the federal courts must
be cautious not to defeat the will of Congress by allowing civil rights
suits by prisoners that circumvent habeas corpus proceedings. 0 2 The
test set forth by the court in Spina is whether a prisoner's action"constitutes, through the effects of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel, an indirect challenge to the fact or duration of his confinement
which must be pursued initially through habeas corpus."103 Thus, the
district court should review relevant state law and determine
whether dismissal without prejudice will preserve the prisoner's
claim until he exhausts all state remedies and can petition for habeas
corpus.' 04 If the court determines that the action will not be pre-




Recently a f]ew circuits have attempted to follow the Supreme
Court's apparent intent in Preiser and Wolff, which allows actions
for damages or declaratory relief to be brought in federal court with-
out exhaustion of state remedies. 1 6 Cases from the Seventh Circuit
100. Id. at 1127.
101. Id. at 1128. The court reiterated the Fifth Circuit rule:
[P]risoners who challenge either (1) the constitutionality of the state court con-
viction or sentence underlying their confinement, or (2) a single allegedly de-
fective hearing affecting their eligibility for, or entitlement to, accelerated
release, must pursue their claims through habeas corpus. . . . [E]ven broad-
based challenges to rules or procedures ... must be pursued in habeas corpus if
resolution of the factual and legal obligations necessary to resolve the civil
rights claims would automatically entitle one or more plaintiffs to accelerated
release.
Id.
102. Id. "Federal courts, therefore, must be wary of defeating the will of Congress
by allowing the prisoners to bring civil rights suits against either state or federal officials
that directly or indirectly circumvent habeas corpus proceedings or reduce them to an
'exercise in futility."' Id.
103. Id. The court, however, noted that "our holding in no way 'defeats' Spina's
right to redress his ... claims. We merely hold that he may not pursue those claims until
he exhausts remedies available to him through habeas corpus." Id.
104. Id. at 1129.
105. Id. The court explained that "[i]f such dismissal will defeat Spina's opportu-
nity to assert his ... claims, the district court may stay those claims or take any other
action that will preserve Spina's rights." Id.
106. See Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1989) (prisoners implicated in
an attempted escape filed action claiming denial of due process and were not required to
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and the Eleventh Circuit provide examples of this treatment of the
conflict.
1. The Seventh Circuit: Viens v. Daniels
The Seventh Circuit adhered to the idea of dismissing any
nonexhausted claim until its recent decision in Viens v. Daniels.107 In
Viens, two prisoners sued for declaratory relief and compensatory
and punitive damages for punishment occurring after being impli-
cated in an attempted prison escape. 108 The district court held that
exhaustion was required because a favorable judgment might be
used as collateral estoppel in later habeas actions seeking actual res-
toration of good time credits. 09 The Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed the lower court's dismissal and allowed the
prisoners to bring their section 1983 claims without exhaustion of
state remedies. 110
The court of appeals interpreted Wolff as a confirmation of the
exhaust state remedies as action fell under § 1983); Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616 (11th
Cir. 1989) (prisoner's claim of racial prejudice in denial of parole and compassionate
leave fell within § 1983 and did not require exhaustion of state remedies).
107. 871 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1989). See Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93 (7th Cir.
1986) (prisoner challenged prison disciplinary hearing procedure that deprived him of
good time credits and the court held that the prisoner's sole remedy was in habeas
corpus). The Viens court declined to "determine the applicability of Preiser solely by
reference to the relief sought rather than by reference to the nature of the claim." Viens,
871 F.2d at 1332; Crump v. Lane, 807 F.2d 1394, 1395, 1401 (7th Cir. 1986) (prisoner
challenged parole board denial of parole by habeas corpus and civil rights actions and the
court dismissed the claims because of failure to exhaust). The Crump court, after identi-
fying an apparent conflict with Wolff, stated, "The core of Crump's claim concerns the
fact or duration of his confinement, and any award of damages would be entirely depen-
dent upon favorable resolution of that issue." 807 F.2d at 1401.
108. Viens, 871 F.2d at 1330. Prison officials discovered two homemade ladders
against the prison wall. No one had actually escaped. The morning the ladders were
discovered, Perruquet, one of the prisoners, went to the prison infirmary with a broken
foot and strained ligaments. He claimed he had fallen down a flight of stairs. Viens,
another prisoner, claimed that he saw Perruquet fall. Another inmate testified that the
two had planned to escape. At a hearing before the prison disciplinary committee, the
committee denied requests of the prisoners to examine certain witnesses and to examine
some of the evidence. The committee found both of the prisoners guilty and revoked 360
days of each prisoner's good time credits and ordered the prisoners be placed in discipli-
nary segregation for 360 days. Id. at 1329-30.
109. Id. at 1330. The court of appeals explained, "The district court believed that
section 2254's policy of giving state courts the first opportunity to rule on matters affect-
ing the duration of a state prisoner's confinement would be undermined if a prisoner were
allowed to bring a section 1983 damages action without first applying to state court." Id.
110. Id. at 1334. A major factor in the court's decision was that the court per-
ceived the prisoners' claims as substantial. The court stated, "These punishments are
substantial; plaintiffs do not challenge these sanctions merely as a pretext to attack the
revocation of good time." Id.
Preiser holding-the distinction to be drawn between habeas corpus
petitions and section 1983 claims is the relief being sought.11 The
court found additional support for its position in the Supreme Court
case of Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents,"2 which held that under
section 1983 a plaintiff need only exhaust state remedies when spe-
cifically provided for by Congress.' The court of appeals inter-
preted this to mean that the exhaustion requirement should be
-construed narrowly. 1 4 Additionally, the court rejected the argument
presented by the Eighth Circuit case Offet v. Solem15 that the judg-
ment would act as collateral estoppel in later habeas corpus proceed-
ings."'6 The Viens court avoided a direct conflict with previous
precedent by distinguishing the facts, using as support an Eleventh
Circuit casel" similar to the Viens case."x8 In essence, the court
failed to follow Seventh Circuit precedent in favor of the Supreme
Court remedy test." 9
2. - The Eleventh Circuit: Gwin v. Snow
Although the Eleventh Circuit follows the Fifth Circuit in staying
or dismissing section 1983 actions, the Court of *Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit perceived a conflict with the Supreme Court in the
111. Id. at 1331.
This reading of Preiser was confirmed in Wolff .... In Wolff, as in Preiser,
the prisoner alleged that the procedures used to deprive him of good time were
unconstitutional. However, unlike Preiser, the prisoner in Wolff sought both
restoration of good time and money damages. The Court held that Preiser did
not foreclose the latter claim.
Id.
112. 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (an employee of a Florida university was not required to
exhaust state remedies before bringing her section 1983 claim asserting sexual and racial
discrimination).
113. Id. The court, in response to an argument that the issue of exhaustion in §
1983 claims had yet to be decided, stated, "[W]e have on numerous occasions rejected
the argument that a section 1983 action should be dismissed where the plaintiff has not
exhausted state administrative remedies." Id. at 500.
114. Viens, 871 F.2d at 1334. "The decision in Patsy suggests that Preiser's ex-
haustion requirement should not be too expansively construed." Id.
115. See Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1262 (8th Cir. 1987).
116. Viens, 871 F.2d at 1333. "The analysis... adopted by the Eighth Circuit in
Offet, ultimately proves too much.... [U]nder the collateral estoppel standard the state
could insulate every imposition of discipline from attack under section 1983 by simply
revoking one hour, or one day, of good time as part of every punishment it imposed." Id.
117. See McKinnis v. Mosley, 693 F.2d 1054 (11th Cir. 1982), in which the court
had rejected precedent similar to the Seventh Circuit case of Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d
93 (1986). See supra note 107.
118. Viens, 871 F.2d at 1333.
119. Id. "[Als the Supreme Court recognized in both Preiser and Wolff, a section
1983 action is proper where a prisoner challenges the conditions of his confinement
rather than its duration." Id.
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case of Gwin v. Snow.1 0 Robert Gwin brought actions that chal-
lenged parole board decisions that denied him parole and denied him
compassionate leave. 2' Gwin sought damages and injunctive relief
in both actions. 22 The district court granted summary judgment dis-
missing all claims. Notably, the court dismissed the equal protection
claims because Gwin had failed to exhaust all of his state reme-
dies.123 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court's dismissals except for the section 1983 equal protection
claims. 24
The court interpreted Wolff and Preiser as requiring federal
courts to look only at the relief requested when determining whether
the action properly falls under section 2254 or section 1983.12' Re-
gardless, the court of appeals declined to follow the apparent Su-
preme Court test because the court constrained to follow the
precedent of prior Fifth and Eleventh Circuit decisions. 26 The stan-
dard the court of appeals used provided that "[h]abeas corpus is the
120. 870 F.2d 616 (11th Cir. 1989).
121. Id. at 617-18. Gwin was a black inmate serving a life sentence. Gwin claimed
that the Georgia Department of Corrections Parole Board, which had only one black
member, had continually denied Gwin parole in violation of his equal protection rights
because the Board considered both Gwin's race and the race of his victim in making their
decision. The Board also denied him compassionate leave when his mother died. Id. at
618.
122. Id. Gwin requested declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $70,000 in
damages from each board member for denial of parole. He sought injunctive relief, dam-
ages, appointment of counsel, attorney's fees, and a jury trial for denial of compassionate
leave. Id.
123. Id. In addition, the district court dismissed the due process claims because (1)
Gwin had no liberty interest in parole, (2) Gwin's claim of discrimination was too specu-
lative to give Gwin standing to challenge the Board's racial makeup, and (3) Gwin had
no right of access to his parole file. Id. at 618-19.
124. Id. at 625. The court.held, "Because Gwin challenges the Board's procedure
of allegedly considering race as a factor in its parole decisions, he can properly bring his
claim under section 1983 because a declaration of unconstitutionality of such procedures
would not automatically lead to his release." Id.
125. Id. at 621. The court explained:
Integrating the Wolff and Preiser decisions, we see that the Court exclu-
sively focused on the particular relief that the prisoners' [sic] requested to de-
termine whether their complaints necessarily constituted habeas corpus claims.
... [I]ndividuals seeking damages claims or injunctive relief to prospectively
enjoin unconstitutional procedures can use section 1983 and need not exhaust
state court remedies .... [Pirisoners seeking both habeas corpus relief and
proper section 1983 relief can proceed with their section 1983 claims without
exhausting state remedies while simultaneously exhausting state remedies for
their habeas corpus claims.
Id.
126. Id. The Eleventh Circuit, created in 1981, follows the precedent of the Fifth
Circuit up to the time of the circuit split. Id.
exclusive initial cause of action where the basis of the claim goes to
the constitutionality of the state court conviction. 1 27 The court
openly disagreed with the precedent. "To the extent that this court's
decisions prohibit prisoners damages claims under section 1983, we
believe such decisions extend beyond the permissible boundary for
requiring exhaustion of state remedies." 12 8 Without breaking away
from precedent, however, the court found that Gwin had valid sec-
tion 1983 claims because decisions on the claims would not affect the
length of Gwin's sentence.129 Therefore, although the Eleventh Cir-
cuit precedent follows the stay or dismiss idea, the court of appeals
supports the Supreme Court remedies test.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: A TEST INCORPORATING THE SUPREME
COURT'S DAMAGES TEST AND STAYING OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION
PENDING EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES
The conflict among the circuit courts results in giving prisoners in
different circuits different rights. 30 Fairness demands a consistent
127. Id. (citing Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976)). Fulford was
an inmate who sought monetary damages under a claim that the district attorney had
withheld exculpatory evidence. Fulford did not attack the validity of his conviction.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his § 1983 claim for failure to
exhaust all state remedies. Fulford, 529 F.2d at 377. In addition, a panel of the Eleventh
Circuit declared that the "proper rubric for a particular cause of action ought not be
determined 'solely on the basis of relief sought, i.e., actions for money damages may go
forward while actions for injunctive relief from incarceration may not.'" McKinnis v.
Mosely, 693 F.2d 1054, 1057 (lth Cir. 1982) (quoting Fulford, 529 F.2d at 381).
128. Gwin, 870 F.2d at 622. The court in Gwin criticized the precedent:
Although our predecessor court recognized that the nature of the required
relief factored into the Court's analysis for distinguishing between proper and
improper section 1983 actions, it repeatedly declined to interpret Preiser and
Wolff as solely relying on the required relief for determining the propriety of a
section 1983 action.
Id. at 621. The court further stated, "[T]o the extent that this court's decisions do not
allow claims under section 1983 for relief which would not reduce a prisoner's confine-
ment, such decisions impermissibly conffict with the Supreme Court's decisions." Id. at
623.
129. Id. at 624. The court distinguished Gwin's claim:
Even under this narrower test, however, Gwin can bring two of his claims
under section 1983 without exhausting state remedies. First, Gwin's equal pro-
tection claim challenging the denial of compassionate leave, if successful, will
not lessen the duration of his sentence by one day. Second, both our predeces-
sor court and this court have distinguished between claims challenging a denial
of parole and claims attacking the parole decision process.
Id. (citation omitted).
130. The dissent in Preiser predicted this problem at the time the decision was
made. "[I]t seems clear the scheme's unmanageability is sufficient reason to condemn it.
For the unfortunate but inevitable legacy of today's opinion is a perplexing set of uncer-
tainties and anomalies." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 506 (Brennan, Douglas, & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
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approach be upheld by the Supreme Court or adopted by Con-
gress.131 Any unified solution, however, affects not only prisoners'
rights, but the federal court system and federal-state comity.
This Comment proposes a test that first looks to whether an in-
mate's section 1983 action challenges the prisoner's underlying sen-
tence or challenges some other violation of the prisoner's civil rights,
such as prison conditions or prison disciplinary procedures. If the
section 1983 action challenges the prisoner's underlying sentence,
then the civil rights action should be stayed pending exhaustion of
all state remedies. If the section 1983 action challenges some other
violation of the prisoner's civil rights, then the court should look to
the remedy sought by the prisoner. If the prisoner is requesting re-
lease from prison, then the claim should be stayed until all state
claims are exhausted. If the prisoner is requesting damages or in-
junctive relief, then the claim should be allowed to go forward with-
out exhaustion of state remedies.1 32 This section discusses the effects
of the application of the proposed test in the area of prisoners' rights,
the federal courts, and federal-state comity.
A. Effect of Conflict on Prisoners' Rights
In many instances a prisoner may seek redress for violation of the
same constitutional rights under either habeas corpus or section
1983.133 Nonetheless, any reconciliation of the procedural conflict
131. The Federal Judicial Center says of the conflict, "[T]his is a matter that will
have to be resolved either through a decision of the United States Supreme Court or by a
congressional amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254." THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra
note 30, at I n.8.
132. This test is similar to the approach taken in Young v. Kenny. See supra notes
87-96 and accompanying text. Note, however, that this test would allow some cases to go
forward without exhaustion that Young would not allow because this test screens out
those making claims against their original convictions and uses the Supreme Court rem-
edy test, rather than simply looking to see if a determination affecting a prisoner's sen-
tence must be made. This preserves § 1983 claims to a greater extent.
133. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). The Supreme Court empha-
sized the similarities between the two actions: "[W]hile it is true that only in habeas
actions may relief be granted which will shorten the term of confinement ... it is more
pertinent that both actions serve to protect basic constitutional rights." Id. The Court
further stated that it found "no reasonable distinction between the two forms of action."
Id. at 580.
The Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Judicial Center
both oppose bringing state condition-of-confinement cases under a writ of habeas corpus.
The Advisory Committee stated:
"It is, however, the view of the Advisory Committee that claims of improper
conditions of custody or confinement... can be better handled by other means
such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .... [T]he [Supreme] Court treated a habeas corpus
should recognize that neither action should take precedent over the
other and should assure that procedure is not exalted over sub-
stance.134 At the very core of the substantive problem is adequate
protection of prisoners' civil rights. 135 This section focuses on prison-
ers' rights in the areas of speedy determination and access to federal
courts-two areas of prisoners' civil rights that are greatly affected
by the imposition of an exhaustion requirement.
1. Speedy Determination, Res Judicata,
and Collateral Estoppel
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Young v. Kenny reasoned
against dismissal of the prisoner's section 1983 claim by noting that
the result was too harsh.13 The court recognized that the exhaustion
of state remedies may take years to complete. By the time the pris-
oner is able to refile a section 1983 action, the statute of limitations
may have run.1 37 The Ninth Circuit stated, "[I]t would hardly pro-
mote the goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to twice deny prison-
ers a federal forum for section 1983 complaints, once for being too
early and again for being too late."'3 "
One way to avoid this problem would be the use of a res judicata
or collateral estoppel test."3 9 That is, a prisoner would be able to go
forward with a section 1983 claim as long as a judgment on the
claim would not estop a state court from making an independent
decision on the validity of the prisoner's sentence in any future
habeas corpus proceedings.140 The court in Viens argued against the
petition by a state prisoner challenging the conditions of confinement as a
claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act."
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 30, at 1 n.8 (quoting H.R. DOC. NO. 94-
464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1976)).
134. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579. In the course of discussing inmates right of access to
the courts, the Supreme Court in Wolff stated:
It is futile to contend that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less importance
in our constitutional scheme than does the Great Writ. The recognition by this
Court that prisoners have certain constitutional rights which can be protected
by civil rights actions would be diluted if inmates... were unable to articulate
their complaints to the courts.
Id.
135. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
136. Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1990).
137. Id. The Young court expressed concerns about this issue: "Exhaustion of state
remedies is a process that may take years to complete; it is not farfetched to contemplate
that a prisoner may be unable to exhaust state remedies before the limitations period
expires on his section 1983 claim." Id.
138. Id.
139. A collateral estoppel test was used by the Fifth Circuit in Spina. See supra
notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
140. Res judicata principles apply fully to civil rights actions and partially to
habeas corpus proceedings. Thus, a state prisoner may seek federal habeas corpus relief
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use of a collateral estoppel test because, "under the collateral estop-
pel standard the state could insulate every imposition of discipline
from attack under section 1983 by simply revoking one hour, or one
day, of good time as part of every punishment it imposed." '141 Hence,
the collateral estoppel test could, in essence, defeat all section 1983
claims brought by prisoners.
Another solution is to stay the civil rights action pending exhaus-
tion of state remedies. 42 While a stay of the section 1983 claim
on the claim for which the state has denied relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1988). The stat-
ute lists the exceptions to res judicata:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by
a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant
for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced
by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written
indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or
it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State
court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over
the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation
of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the
State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in
the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the
State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in
which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual
determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal
court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes
that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one
or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1)
to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted
by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, consid-
ered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden
shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the fac-
tual determination by the state court was erroneous.
Id. See also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973).
141. Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir. 1989).
142. The Ninth Circuit recommended this solution in Young. The court explained,
pending exhaustion would avoid statute of limitations problems,
staying does not adequately address the need for immediate relief
sometimes sought in section 1983 actions. 43 This concern is cer-
tainly most pressing when a prisoner is challenging prison conditions,
for example, a prisoner trying to get an injunction against unconsti-
tutional prison disciplinary policies. Thus, the proposed test would
allow those seeking injunctive relief or damages immediate access to
the federal courts and would preserve the claims of those challenging
their underlying convictions or seeking release from prison.
2. Access to Federal Courts
The right of prisoners to have access to the courts is compelling
and should be preserved.4 Eighth Circuit Judge Arnold noted,
"[T]he policy favoring exhaustion is not the only policy operating in
this area. There is also a policy, stated by Congress in § 1983, mak-
ing available a federal forum for actions complaining of deprivation
of federal rights under color of state law."' 45 Furthermore, according
to the Supreme Court's analysis in Patsy v. Florida Board of Re-
gents, in enacting section 1983 Congress intended to allow a section
1983 plaintiff to choose between state and federal courts . 40 The
1871 Congress also believed that the state authorities were "unable
or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights of individuals.' 47
The Supreme Court test focusing on the remedy carefully protects
prisoners' access to the courts. However, prisoners challenging their
underlying conviction have already had an opportunity to present
their cases through the trial and appeals process. A prisoner chal-
lenging internal prison procedure has not had the opportunity of this
"[D]istrict courts in some circuits stay, rather than dismiss, section 1983 complaints in
this posture. This is a wise policy." Young, 907 F.2d at 878 (citations omitted).
143. Professor Krantz states, "[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies should not
be required when it will mean substantial delays in responding to prisoners' claims, when
the constitutionality of a prison regulation is at issue, where the administrator alone can-
not appropriately remedy the grievances, or where resort to administrative remedy is
futile." KRANTZ, supra note 18, at 271.
144. The ABA standards state, "Prisoners should have free and meaningful access
to the judicial process; governmental authorities should assure such access. Regulations
or actions should not unduly delay or adversely affect the outcome of a prisoner's claim
for relief or discourage prisoners from seeking judicial consideration for their griev-
ances." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 23-2.1 at II(a) (2d ed. 1980 & Supp.
1986). See also Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971) ("State prisoners are
not held to any stricter standard of exhaustion than other civil rights plaintiffs.").
145. Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1262 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
The court in Viens also stated, "We cannot accept such off-hand treatment of the impor-
tance to a state prisoner of prompt access to federal court under section 1983 where the
prisoner alleges that the conditions of his confinement violate the constitution." 871 F.2d
at 1333.
146. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 506 (quoted in Viens, 871
F.2d at 1334).
147. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 505, quoted in Viens, 871 F.2d at 1334.
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access to the courts. Also, considerations of the limitations of the
judicial system sometimes must override the absolute freedom of ac-
cess to the courts.14 The proposed test attempts to protect access to
the courts by granting immediate access where it is most needed,
while at the same time minimizing the possible detrimental effects
on the federal courts and federal-state comity.
B. Effect of Conflict on Federal Courts
According to the Supreme Court's analysis in Patsy v. Florida
Board of Regents, in enacting section 1983 "Congress assigned the
federal courts a paramount role in protecting constitutional
rights."' 4 9 Notwithstanding, some practical concerns face federal
courts adjudicating civil rights actions of prisoners. On one hand,
overloaded federal dockets are a large factor in the push for narrow-
ing the scope of section 1983 actions by prisoners. Prisoners bring a
large number of frivolous suits. The courts argue that requiring ex-
haustion in a greater number of circumstances will reduce the flood
of litigation.
50
On the other hand, state courts, just as federal courts, are over-
worked and a broad interpretation of section 1983 jurisdiction may
be more efficient and less burdensome to already crowded state
courts. Furthermore, often the issues presented are likely to be re-
solved in the federal court system eventually. Nonetheless, staying
the civil rights action in a majority of the cases would probably in-
crease judicial economy. Not only could the civil rights action be
brought at the same time as a possible habeas corpus action, but the
148. The Guerro court explained:
[W]hatever cost to the litigant may be involved, there is an overriding cost that
is avoided. Damage to the smooth operation of the administration of criminal
justice, injury to the proper workings of a federal system, and undermining of
congressional concern with the functioning of the writ of habeas corpus-all
are harms which are prevented by the requirement that a civil rights damage
action be deferred.
Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1254 (Ist Cir. 1974).
149. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 503, quoted in Viens, 871 F.2d at 1334.
150. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Wolff, generally discredits the Court's argu-
ments for administrative efficiency. Marshall stated,
The Court again cites concern for administrative efficiency in support of its
holding: 'Proceedings would inevitably be longer and tend to unmanageability.'
I can only assume that these are makeweights, for I refuse to believe that the
Court would deny fundamental rights in reliance on such trivial and easily han-
dled concerns.
418 U.S. at 586 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
two actions could possibly be consolidated251 Additionally, if prison-
ers continue to file suits, regardless of the merits of their claims, it
might increase judicial efficiency to have a clear test that avoids liti-
gation over whether the suit falls within the ambit of habeas corpus
or of the Civil Rights Act. Providing a bright-line rule may allow
prisoners to be aware of their rights to bring suit in federal court,
which in turn will save court time spent litigating the appropriate-
ness of the claims.152 The proposed test promotes judicial economy
because it gives easy-to-follow guidelines that encourage staying civil
rights claims and exhaustion of state remedies.
An additional problem the federal courts face is the responsibility
of preserving the will of Congress in enacting the habeas corpus stat-
utes. As the court in Spina warns, "Federal courts, therefore, must
be wary of defeating the will of Congress by allowing prisoners to
bring civil rights suits against either state or federal officials that
directly or indirectly circumvent habeas corpus proceedings or re-
duce them to 'an exercise in futility.' ,,153 By requiring exhaustion
when the prisoner challenges an underlying conviction or seeks re-
lease from prison, the proposed test preserves the intent behind
habeas corpus.
C. Effect of Conflict on Federal-State Comity
Federal-state comity is one of the bases for the exhaustion doc-
trine and is often given as a reason for narrow interpretations of the
actions allowed under section 1983. Many federal courts argue that
state courts should have the first opportunity to correct their mis-
takes. 54 In addition, the state interest in prisoners is greater than
their interest in the general population because the state controls
every aspect of a prisoner's life.1 55 In the Guerro case, the First Cir-
cuit discussed the issue of federal-state comity in depth. The court
concluded that:
Where the federal court in dealing with the question of damages caused
151. Guerro, 498 F.2d at 1254 n.15. In addition, the court asserted that the deter-
mination of damages would be simplified and the possibility of attack because of failure
to mitigate damages or speculativeness would be reduced. Id.
152. A committee set up by Justice Rehnquist examining death row inmates found
a need to a simpler, unified approach: "The lack of coordination between the federal and
state legal systems often results in inefficient and unnecessary steps in the course of liti-
gation. Prisoners, for example, often spend significant time moving back and forth be-
tween the federal and state systems in the process of exhausting state remedies." Panel
Seeks New Limits on Death Row Appeals, MANHATTAN LAWYER, Oct. 3-9, 1989, at 15.
153. Spina v. Aaron, 821 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Fulford v.
Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976)).
154. See, e.g., Young, 907 F-2d at 876. "It is well-established that the states have
a substantial interest in the administration of their prisons, and in the correction of any
problems that may arise therein." Id.
155. See supra note 47.
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by violation of civil rights, would have to making rulings by virtue of which
the validity of a conviction in contemporary state proceedings would be
called into question, the potential for federal-state friction is obvious. The
federal ruling would embarrass, and could even intrude into the state pro-
ceedings. Questions concerning the effect to be given the federal ruling in
the state courts might be difficult ones, and could lead to delay, or even
derailment of the course of the state action.156
The proposed test provides for the preservation of the states' abil-
ity to correct its mistakes, particularly in the area of underlying con-
victions, which is arguably the most intrusive area for the federal
courts to become involved in. The proposed test also goes a step fur-
ther and protects the state from federal intervention prior to exhaus-
tion of state remedies when the prisoner is not challenging an
underlying conviction, but requests release from prison. An example
would be the restoration of good time credits removed as punishment
without a hearing. The possibility remains that the federal court
award of damages or injunction in a parole or good-time credit case
could have an effect of a later habeas corpus case, however, this nar-
row area certainly falls within the intent of the Supreme Court in
Preiser and Wolff.
VI. CONCLUSION
State prisoners have two avenues of redress to challenge violation
of their rights. First, they may petition for a writ of habeas corpus
when challenging their confinement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Sec-
ond, they may bring a civil rights action when challenging the condi-
tions of their imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Preiser
and Wolff decisions, the Supreme Court established a bright-line test
to distinguish between the two types of actions. The circuit courts
have consistently failed to follow this test, creating conflicts with the
Supreme Court as well as among. the circuit courts. The conflict
needs to be resolved to provide a fair and consistent test to determine
when prisoners may bring section 1983 claims without exhausting all
of their state remedies. The Supreme Court's test looking solely at
the requested relief protects the prisoner's constitutional rights, even
when a determination may require decision on a collateral issue oth-
erwise in the province of habeas corpus. Yet, in some cases this test
promotes judicial inefficiency and could have detrimental side effects
on state and federal relations.1 57
The Supreme Court's remedy rule is most effective when prisoners
156. Guerro, 498 F.2d 1253.
157. Justice White recognized the present confusion in Bressman v. Farrier, 111 S.
challenge prison conditions as in the Preiser and Wolff cases. Chal-
lenges to a prisoner's underlying sentence, however, should be guided
by the rules of habeas corpus, requiring exhaustion of state remedies
to preserve the purposes underlying habeas corpus actions as well as
prisoners' civil rights.
LINDA MARIE BELL
Ct. 1090 (1991)(White, J., dissenting). He stated, "Because of the confusion and diver-
gence of opinion these issues have generated in the Court of Appeals, and the fact that
this Court has not ruled definitively upon the issues presented, I would grant certiorari."
Id. at 1091 (White, J., dissenting).
